Two Marines died. U.S. Marines and their allies killed thousands of NVA, but to solve the riddle of Khe Sanh, you have to recount the numbers. Just days before, as the Army of the . The US command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around KSCB during 1967 were part of a series of minor PAVN offensives in the border regions. The Marines, whose aircraft and doctrine were integral to their operations, were under no such centralized control. Since the official duration of the battle ends even earlier than the termination of the siege itself, a wider definition of the Khe Sanh battlefield to include Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II also seems reasonable. [112][113][114] In addition, over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped until mid-April by aircraft of the USAF, US Navy and Marines onto the area surrounding Khe Sanh. The deaths of U.S. Air Force personnel, estimated between five and 20, are also omitted. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled Victory at Khe Sanh, reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. Home > Features > Battle of Khe Sanh > View All. Free shipping for many products! That was accomplished, but the casualties absorbed by the North Vietnamese seemed to negate any direct gains they might have obtained. The NVAs main command post was located in Laos, at Sar Lit. At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese. server. [58] The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). [70] Regardless, the SOG reconnaissance teams kept patrolling, providing the only human intelligence available in the battle area. [59], During the rainy night of 2 January 1968, six men dressed in black uniforms were seen outside the defensive wire of the main base by members of a listening post. [58] These tactics were reminiscent of those employed against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, particularly in relation to entrenching tactics and artillery placement, and the realization assisted US planners in their targeting decisions. [115] This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh. This, however, did not prevent the Marine tanks within the perimeter from training their guns on the SOG camp. [86] The command and control arrangement then in place in Southeast Asia went against Air Force doctrine, which was predicated on the single air manager concept. Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazines book review editor. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. [12] With the abandonment of the base, according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam". The Marines found a solution to the problem in the "Super Gaggle" concept. When the weather later cleared in March, the amount was increased to 40 tons per day. [145], Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968". One of the first enemy shells set off an explosion in the main ammunition dump. [Note 5] This event prompted Cushman to reinforce Lownds with the rest of the 2nd Battalion, 26th Marines. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Military History Institute of Vietnam, p. 222. Battle of Khe Sanh: American Casualties : Showing All Results. [82], By the end of the battle, USAF assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. That was superseded by the smaller contingency plans. On the afternoon of 29 January, however, the 3rd Marine Division notified Khe Sanh that the truce had been cancelled. The low figure often cited for US casualties (205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing) does not take into account U.S. Army or Air Force casualties or those incurred during Operation Pegasus. The badly-deteriorated Route 9 ran from the coastal region through the western highlands and crossed the border into Laos. Both sides have published official histories of the battle, and while these histories agree the fighting took place at Khe Sanh, they disagree on virtually every other aspect of it. Background [ edit] [29], During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. 528 of them include images. [94] Although the PAVN was known to possess two armored regiments, it had not yet fielded an armored unit in South Vietnam, and besides, the Americans considered it impossible for them to get one down to Khe Sanh without it being spotted by aerial reconnaissance. [22] The camp then became a Special Forces outpost of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, which were to keep watch on PAVN infiltration along the border and to protect the local population. They were not included in the official Khe Sanh counts. "[91][92], Not much activity (with the exception of patrolling) had occurred thus far during the battle for the Special Forces Detachment A-101 and their four companies of Bru CIDGs stationed at Lang Vei. [80] Westmoreland insisted for several months that the entire Tet Offensive was a diversion, including, famously, attacks on downtown Saigon and obsessively affirming that the true objective of the North Vietnamese was Khe Sanh. The Armys 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with more than 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy-controlled areas. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. [102], The Lao troops were eventually flown back to their homeland, but not before the Laotian regional commander remarked that his army had to "consider the South Vietnamese as enemy because of their conduct. "[162] Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists for Hanoi to commit so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for the Tet Offensive. . On July 11, the Marines finally left Khe Sanh. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Due to the nature of these activities, and the threat that they posed to KSCB, Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Valley. They produced a body count ratio in the range between 50:1 and 75:1. It claimed, however, that only three American advisors were killed during the action. By early January, the defenders could count on fire support from 46 artillery pieces of various calibers, five tanks armed with 90-mm guns, and 92 single or Ontos-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. Besieged, Khe Sanh could only be resupplied by air. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. In his memoirs, he listed the reasons for a continued effort: Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In response, US forces were built up before the PAVN isolated the Marine base. [64], The main base was then subjected to an intense mortar and rocket barrage. Of the 7877 officer casualties, 7595 or 96.4% were white, 147 or 1.8% were black; 24 or . [35], American intelligence analysts were quite baffled by the series of enemy actions. Cushman, the new III MAF commander, supported Westmoreland perhaps because he wanted to mend Army/Marine relations after the departure of Walt. At dawn on 21 January, it was attacked by a roughly 300-strong PAVN battalion. The PAVN would try to take Khe Sanh, but if could not, it would occupy the attention of as many American and South Vietnamese forces in I Corps as it could, which would facilitate the Tet Offensive. This is the battles end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. [38], Westmoreland won out, however, and the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment (1/3 Marines) was dispatched to occupy the camp and airstrip on 29 September. [170][140], One argument that was then leveled by Westmoreland and has since often quoted by historians of the battle is that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh, compared with the several PAVN divisions. [158] The question, known among American historians as the "riddle of Khe Sanh," has been summed up by John Prados and Ray Stubbe: "Either the Tet Offensive was a diversion intended to facilitate PAVN/VC preparations for a war-winning battle at Khe Sanh, or Khe Sanh was a diversion to mesmerize Westmoreland in the days before Tet. A limited attack was made by a PAVN company on 1 July, falling on a company from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, who were holding a position 3km to the southeast of the base. During the course of the siege, the U.S. Air Force dropped five tons of bombs for each of the estimated 20,000 attacking NVA troops. But only by checking my service record while writing this article did it become evident that I had participated in all three operations. Name State Date War Branch; 1: Steven Glenn Abbott . [77] When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. As a result of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 22 January 1968 by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. [97] During a meeting at Da Nang at 07:00 the next morning, Westmoreland and Cushman accepted Lownds' decision. Less likely to be mentioned is the final high-casualty engagement between units of the U.S. infantry and the North Vietnamese Army. [56], At positions west of Hill 881 South and north of Co Roc Ridge (163340N 1063755E / 16.561N 106.632E / 16.561; 106.632), across the border in Laos, the PAVN established artillery, rocket, and mortar positions from which to launch attacks by fire on the base and to support its ground operations. On January 21 at Khe Sanh, 30,000 North Vietnamese troops attacked an air base held by just 6,000 United States Marines. [157], Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11 wounded. Sporadic actions were taken in the vicinity during the late summer and early fall, the most serious of which was the ambush of a supply convoy on Route 9. Both sides suffered major casualties with both claiming victory of their own. During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. 239240. The Twenty-fifth United States Infantry Regiment was one of the racially segregated units of the United States Army known as Buffalo Soldiers.The 25th served from 1866 to 1957, seeing action in the American Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, Philippine-American War and World War II. Five days later, the final reinforcements arrived in the form of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which was deployed more for political than tactical reasons. The 26th Marines were activated in 1944 and fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II and were activated again on 1 March 1966, and fought in the Battle of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War . The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. The Battle of Ban Houei Sane, not the attack three weeks later at Lang Vei, marked the first time that the PAVN had committed an armored unit to battle. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. [39], On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Bravo Company became engaged with a PAVN force of an unknown size north of Hill 861. As far as PAVN casualties were concerned, 1,602 bodies were counted, seven prisoners were taken, and two soldiers defected to allied forces during the operation. Naval aircrews, many of whom were redirected from Operation Rolling Thunder strikes against North Vietnam, flew 5,337 sorties and dropped 7,941 tons of ordnance in the area. [69] Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, KSCB was further reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. The site was first established near the village and later moved to the French fort. Marines stayed in the area, conducting operations to recover the bodies of Marines killed previously. At the same time, the 304th Division withdrew to the southwest. The Battle of Khe Sanh began 50 years ago this week when roughly 20,000 North Vietnamese troops surrounded an isolated combat base . The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. [173][174], After the ARVN defeat in Laos, the newly-reopened KSCB came under attack by PAVN sappers and artillery and the base was abandoned once again on 6 April 1971.[175][176]. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. The microwave/tropo site was located in an underground bunker next to the airstrip.
battle of khe sanh casualties
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